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REVIEW ARTICLE

Reading Zimbabwe internationally: Little errors, larger truths

Zimbabwe's International Relations: Fantasy, Reality and the Making of the State, by Julia Gallagher, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 184 pp., £75 (hardcover), ISBN 978-1-107-18320-9

Why Mugabe Won: The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe and their Aftermath, by Stephen Chan and Julia Gallagher, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 193 pp., £75 (hardcover), ISBN 978-1-107-11716-7

Kingdom, Power, Glory: Mugabe, ZANU and the Quest for Supremacy, 1960–1987, by Stuart Doran, Midrand, Sithatha Media, 2017, 864 pp., ZAR350 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-620-75290-0

Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism, by Sarah Rich Dorman, London, Hurst, 2016, 347 pp., £17.99 (paperback), ISBN 978-1-849-04583-4

This essay did not start as a disquisition on mistakes. However, some serendipitously related gaffes in the books reviewed herein made me wonder if Zimbabwe alone inspires errors of all sizes and import – or is this problem widespread when books are in surfeit and fact-checkers in short supply? First was a tiny *faux pas* in Stephen Chan and Julia Gallagher's *Why Mugabe Won*. They confused the late Wilfred Mhanda – my personal hero and one of the first and most consistent critics of Zimbabwe's 'old guard' – with Britain-based journalist Wilf Mbanga. They also cite Mhanda's unpublished essay rather than his book (pp. 102–103; 181).¹ Soon after, I discovered Sarah Rich Dorman's violation of history in *Understanding Zimbabwe* (a quest destined to fall on many swords). She claims that Robert Mugabe gained control over the much-splintered Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1975 (p. 20),² while simultaneously asserting that attempts to unify the party were externally generated. It actually took nearly three more years before Mugabe ascended that particularly well-greased pole. These seemingly small slips join to hide a truth: Mhanda (aka Dzinashe 'Dzino' Machingura) contributed significantly to the difficulty of Mugabe's climb to the top, and he and his cohorts pushed for unity regardless of outside influence.³

Thus, seemingly little mistakes can hide larger truths. Mugabe's long fight in the 1970s within the faction-filled embryonic ruling party surely led Zimbabwe's president to think '*après moi, le déluge*' at least two-thirds of the way through his 37 years in power and to do his utmost to restrain the storms. In a Bonapartist social formation without well-formed classes and institutions mediating leaders' megalomania and paranoia, such destinies are manifest. Maybe the late 2017 coup was the only way out of Mugabe's cul-de-sac.⁴

The mistakes proliferate and are not confined to Zimbabwe. Perhaps the question is: when do they matter? In this era of purposefully fake news, what are the unintended and inconsequential errors? Where are the serious blunders and perhaps more deliberate deceptions? Confusing James Scott with James Ferguson should not detract from a treatise on African democracy.⁵ However, trouble looms with wrongly dated elections, claims that Zimbabwe 'achieved smoother and more successful processes of democratization (up to the late 1990s)' than

countries more prone to the pitfalls of 'neo-patrimonialism',⁶ and mistiming and misinterpreting the International Monetary Fund's refusal to dispense loans.⁷

Yet while relatively tiny misconstructions reduce one's reading appetite and lend doubt to the whole work's veracity, they might not diminish larger perspectives of good analysis and the pleasures of good writing. However, what of RW Johnson's egregious claim of 100 000 killed (actually closer to six – in other words, exaggerated by 99 994) during ZANU-PF's mid-2005 Operation Murambatsvina (Remove the Rubbish), a crackdown on urban residents after they dared vote against the party? Could it be saved by his searing writing style, albeit seemingly often informed by obscure sources, conspiracy theory and a hyper-liberal ideology?⁸

Agrarian political economists may well mix up magical realists and confuse political parties' birthdates,⁹ but in their own realm they can be taken to task. Does similar negligence apply to their calculations regarding the consequences and sustainability of the small farms claimed during Zimbabwe's second land grab (the colonial one was first)? Norma Kriger's ripping review suggests so: for her, the attempt by Scoones *et al.* to verify the new settlers' success fails profoundly to meet their 'claim of an objective study' with 'hard evidence and rigorous analysis'.¹⁰

This is a book written with passion and prejudice. Political bias is ubiquitous, text and tables are riddled with inconsistencies, and inconvenient facts are ignored. Without the promised rigor, readers are left with the 'new' idea that Africans, when given land, engaged in some promising economic activity and demonstrated some agency.

Efforts to attain apolitical and technocratic truth, when combined with empirical and conceptual blunders, beg broader political economy questions. Given the backward and forward linkages between Zimbabwe's agrarian economy and its consequentially deindustrialised urban wasteland,¹¹ arguments about *post facto* tenure arrangements may be superfluous.¹² Furthermore, the widespread neglect by 'agrarian patriots'¹³ of the politics of post-2000 land reclamation may indicate analytical lacunae staining the whole enterprise. This would be a bigger untruth than the micro-empirical ones. Until a comprehensive chronicle of all of these connections is contrived, we will remain with tales such as *Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land*,¹⁴ in which all the new farmers are portrayed as Adam Smith's hard-working protégés – but unsure about the tenure arrangements securing their existence.

The bigger picture

Perhaps there are two big truths against which the books under review can be judged: one – a holistic political economy perspective avoids compartmentalisation; two, even more importantly but linked tightly – careful empirical history is central. Huge vacuums yawn without these, and very large accumulations of properly documented evidence are required to fill them.

In the historical realm, Stuart Doran's exceptionally detailed masterpiece, voracious in its veracity, towers by miles over the rest – indeed above anything I have read on Zimbabwean political history. *Kingdom, Power, Glory* allows no doubt about ZANU-PF's insatiable desire for total power – and, perhaps singularly, Mugabe's.

After reading more than 655 pages of documented evidence – and 148 pages of notes demonstrating the vast but impeccably collected array of diplomatic communications, careful interviews and secondary sources – one can only agree with Doran that Mugabe's 'determination and skill' at pursuing the otherwise unremarkable nationalist and one-party state tropes of the 1950s and 1960s 'marked him out from his peers'. His 'intellectual ability ... absolute commitment to violence ... patience and shrewdness ... [and] aggression was controlled and organised' to carefully 'play rivals and threats one against the other' (p. 644). This contributed immensely to a Zimbabwe that barely survived his forced retirement.

The system emerging in his image has been labelled 'Mugabeism'.¹⁵ Because it is so wrapped up in his person, this ism's institutionalisation might not outlast him for more than a generation. On the other hand, it is harder to imagine that the incumbent president, Emmer-son 'the crocodile' Mnangagwa, will be able to balance Zimbabwe's many mutually antagonistic forces for long beyond Mugabe. Indeed, it was Mugabe's own attempts to use these forces to his advantage that led to his downfall – eventually.

Not that Mugabe focused only on domestic forces in his quest for power. Doran shows very well how he played the international game during Gukurahundi,¹⁶ as he did during the liberation struggle, and in the 1990s and 2000s.¹⁷

One cannot gainsay the dilemmas facing global and regional powers when confronting mass atrocities such as Gukurahundi, especially given the Cold War context and with Namibia and South Africa awaiting entrance to the decolonised halls. Furthermore, as we know from Biafra, Somalia and Rwanda, not to mention Vietnam, interventions in such situations often fail through either caution or exuberance. Mugabe played these chords and contradictions masterfully. A few well-timed words of solace, Doran notes, delivered 'with the personal charm that he exuded during one-on-one contact' moderated Western responses to the near genocide; it was as if he knew the threshold of brutality beyond which diplomats would act (pp. 527–29).

In such an environment, even the small choices of external powers – difficult as they are – can make a difference. However, in the 1980s such opportunities were mostly missed, as they were by the prime regional diplomats in Pretoria more recently.¹⁸ Doran's take on the West's caution is less 'wilful blindness', as per Hazel Cameron's important contribution,¹⁹ than pusillanimous prevarication.

Doran is also loath to accept the line proffered by the more conspiratorially Cold War-minded, who claim that Mugabe and company were part of UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's plan to stall a Soviet-controlled alliance between the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and South Africa's African National Congress.²⁰ There were, of course, British fears about leaving the field open to competitors threatening its interests (including selling arms). These worries were often assuaged with a sardonic refrain along the lines of 'the dust settling' after Mugabe had 'let off steam' in, for example, an 'intemperate, irrational, and emotional performance'. Such assurances were sometimes proffered after a good lunch and an 'entirely amicable talk' with Mnangagwa, then minister of state for security and no stranger to Gukurahundi.²¹

Yet a serious note from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Thatcher in December 1982 indicates Albion's geopolitical thinking at its Toryish heights, while it considered how to handle the increasingly obstinate Mugabe. Along with considerations about the usual business concerns, consolidating the Lancaster House agreement's success, fears of a Zimbabwean collapse or civil war leaving the government with the possibility of abandoning the country and being seen to support 'white Africa', and contemplating the eerie possibility of there being no 'successor [to Mugabe] of comparable stature' in sight, the note highlights the ever-present Soviet threat:²²

Limiting Soviet and Communist Influence If we refuse military sales and aid, Mugabe will turn elsewhere, possibly to the Soviet Union despite his reluctance to do so. If the security situation got bad enough, he might feel obliged to follow the example of Angola and Mozambique and accept large scale military help from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Other Front Line states would also draw the lesson that Western help cannot be relied upon and be more ready to look to the Soviet Union. The US Government attach particular weight to this danger. The worst case scenario would be a virtual Soviet world monopoly of certain strategic minerals and Soviet domination of the key sea lanes around the Cape. [*Emphasis in the original.*]

The desk officer thought a London-based Zimbabwe–UK business association might assist relations. Other suggestions during the preparations for a visit from the Zimbabwean agricultural minister included: a ‘leading university’ offering Mugabe an honorary doctorate; making more university scholarships available to Zimbabwean students; talking further with moderate ministers in hopes that radicals would disappear from cabinet; and ensuring that Ian Smith’s ravings did not gain media traction.

These ideas are tragi-comic when considered alongside Doran’s calculation that the widely cited number of 20 000 killings during Gukurahundi may be low – especially given its long-term effects (pp. 533–41). Perhaps more chilling is his thought that Gukurahundi ‘made an enormous and enduring impression on the country’s politics and inter-ethnic relations’, entrenching a ‘culture of impunity ... violent political intolerance and a belief in the use of force ... [surfacing] repeatedly in the decades that followed, rendering the country incapable of managing political discord and change’. Doran suggests that Gukurahundi was not only a ‘tempestuous and untamed philosophy which impinged itself temporarily if devastatingly ... [but] an expression of a perverse ideal – of what ZANU (PF) believed the people and their rulers were meant to be’ (pp. 540–1).

The past and the politics of the present

This is heavy history indeed. Ignoring it makes readings of Zimbabwe’s politics superficial. Academics and political actors must take this deep historical wound – until recently blatantly ignored in official Zimbabwean politics²³ – very seriously.

Derek Matyszak certainly does. His attack on Chan and Gallagher’s *Why Mugabe Won* – the ‘acme of the legitimisation’ of ZANU-PF’s 61% electoral victory in 2013 – blisters.²⁴ Matyszak places ZANU-PF’s brutality-bathed birth front and centre. He argues that the party’s 2013 election success was due to calculated cheating and intimidation more than voters’ disenchantment with the opposition, as some public opinion polls indicated. In particular, he takes issue with Chan and Gallagher’s reliance on, and cavalier reading of, Freedom House’s 2012 report – which recorded only 19% of interviewees supporting Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)²⁵ – to blame the opposition party for a self-inflicted loss.

Matyszak wonders if Zimbabwe’s voters would so easily forget²⁶

a heinous ethnic cleansing [in which] an estimated 20 000 civilians were killed between 1983 and 1987, with villagers burnt alive in their huts, foetuses ripped from the wombs of pregnant mothers and skewered on bayonets and family members made to eat the body parts of slaughtered relatives. Rape, torture and displacements were endemic in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces.

If Zimbabweans’ memories of ZANU-PF’s 1980s ‘cleansing ceremonies’ had faded because they were Shona and not Ndebele, or they supported ZANU-PF over PF-ZAPU, surely they would recall ZANU-PF’s punishment for wrong voting in Operation Murambatsvina or 2008’s Operation Makavhoterapapi (Where Did You Put Your Vote?)?

Matyszak claims that 500 people were killed during the latter,²⁷ operated by ZANU-PF’s military command centre during a presidential run-off that was necessitated by opposition leader Tsvangirai’s earlier 47% plurality. Even ZANU-PF folk who voted for their party members as MPs, but not for Mugabe for president, were killed. Mugabe won the run-off because, after wide consultation, Tsvangirai withdrew to stop the killing. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was so annoyed with ZANU-PF’s violence that its facilitator-in-chief, Thabo Mbeki, was able to impose his dream of a government of national unity for the next five years.

The 2008 killings, torture and displacement were a big factor in the 2013 elections. Citizens feared more: ZANU-PF campaigners often warned of repetition. Yet many MDC members thought that similar violence would not recur, given SADC and the African Union's negative response in 2008; they believed they would romp to victory.

Yet do we have here a misuse of numbers by the critic condemning Chan and Gallagher's 'psephology [as] invariably glib and superficial', ignoring 'the most glaringly anomalous statistic from the 2013 polls – the approximately 1.03 million additional votes obtained by Mugabe when compared with the March 2008 poll'?²⁸ Aside from the MDC's 500 that Matyszak cites, more publicised counts circle around 200, with 5 000 more 'beating and torture' cases and 'about 36 000 people' displaced. Observers closer to the scene (one rushing to file a report just after the election; another relying on the *Washington Post*) counted 45 dead part way through the bloody run-off and 80 after it.²⁹

Subsequent communication with Matyszak confirms that such numbers are hard to get right. At the time, he recalls,³⁰

the figure of 500 *people* murdered was claimed ... then it became a lesser figure of 300 or so *MDC supporters*. Then MDC submitted dossiers of 200 murders of MDC cadres to the attorney-general and the number 200 became carved in stone, as numbers have a way of doing in Zimbabwe without any real backing – 20 000 in Gukurahundi, 700 000 [displaced] in Murambatsvina etc.

It is almost as hard to find reliable statistics in the hundreds as the millions, so debates often circle around the semantics of fear-laden opinions and broad social theory. Chan and Gallagher are said to err because they took the Freedom House survey's 47% 'undeclared' and 'not willing to say' voting intentions as *undecided*, floating voters. There is a big difference. Undecided voters, for Chan and Gallagher, were subjects a reinvented 'caring ZANU-PF' could woo easily, with its new social base among small farmers and entrepreneurs. It could win fairly and squarely – or with populism, propaganda and patronage-oiled persuasion. The other categories just do not want to tell the pollsters what is on their mind. Chan and Gallagher ignored Freedom House's proxies for the undeclared, too, which would have added more to the MDC's tally.

Matyszak is on even firmer ground chastising Chan and Gallagher for missing Afrobarometer's later, larger poll, conducted closer to the election and predicting a close race.³¹ They also downplay the fact that the voters' roll was never released.

He also disputes the argument that a shifting social base contributed to ZANU-PF's 2013 election victory. Brian Raftopoulos (spelled incorrectly by Matyszak) argues that the small farmers who benefitted from the post-2000 invasions of white commercial farms, and entrepreneurs empowered by indigenisation laws, constitute this new constituency.³² They displaced the MDC's lost base – mainly the working class decimated by deindustrialisation. However, Matyszak debunks what he thinks is unempirical guessing: for him, the numbers of new farmers and informal workers, and their ideologies, would not have changed much between 2008 and 2013.³³ Thus he believes cheating is paramount among explanations for ZANU-PF's 2013 electoral victory.

Chan and Gallagher do not neglect ZANU-PF's cons and coercion but they are, as Matyszak says in another context, 'desultory' about it. They almost revel in the MDC's laxity in the lap of what its leaders thought was near victory.

Voices from the ground

As the potent combination of ZANU-PF's coercive capabilities increased and the MDC's clarity as a brighter alternative dimmed over nearly a decade and a half, Zimbabweans' certainties about the nature of politics and their place in it changed too.

This is the refrain common to Gallagher's portion of *Why Mugabe Won*, based on interviews with many relatively ordinary Zimbabweans. Her interviews are complemented by Chan's work on the ZANU-PF elite's prognostications, which ranged from 'surreal to the absurd' as a new ersatz currency entered the scene (p. 169). They were nowhere nearer than anyone else to predicting the 2017 coup.³⁴ It was (and is) clear enough that the political elite – quartered in the MDC's many offshoots as well as ZANU-PF – had little idea how to move the country forward, so its members wavered between nativist indigenisation and the lost ideals of liberalism, with very little enthusiasm about either.³⁵ Should one expect any more? Is it surprising that ordinary Zimbabweans are confused?

Gallagher steps into such ambiguous considerations with *Zimbabwe's International Relations* – the most theoretically innovative of the books under review. Uninitiated international relations readers are taken through psychological theories, ranging from GWF Hegel to Melanie Klein, explaining how individual selves are constructed through their sometimes real and other-times imagined relations to the rest of the world, including states. Robert Jackson's 'quasi-state' is the straw man for this, but perhaps it should not be dismissed so summarily (pp. 2–4; 15). Zimbabwe's lack of empirical sovereignty may be as much a cause of many of its citizens' discontent, as it is of their leaders.

Gallagher's interpretation is innovative and illuminating. Yet it does not reveal a lot about how foreign policy is made or, more precisely, how perceptions from the people make their way (or do not) into global bureaucrats' offices. Foreign policy may be the state realm most isolated from citizens, and in Zimbabwe most policy is made far away from public opinion in any case. At least Gallagher tells us that Mugabe's anti-Albion rants are not shared by Zimbabweans; neither is his 'look East' line.

It would be interesting to take Gallagher's methodology deeper into the heads of Zimbabwe's policymakers. The country's second president, revelling in a renewed relationship with the UK,³⁶ may reveal Thatcher and Mugabe's friendly relations as the new regime consolidated its brutal dominance.³⁷ This may also explain why Gallagher found Matabeleland folk more likely to suspect Britain than their compatriots to the east, although longer historical relations with South Africa go some way to explain why the local superpower is preferred to the former coloniser (pp. 91–4). Again, a longer perspective can help one understand the social formation that is still *becoming* Zimbabwe.³⁸

A crumbling political order

Very little of Zimbabwe's ambiguity and contradictory ideological articulations, or original ways of understanding the country, suffuse Dorman's *Understanding Zimbabwe*. Thus her promises to explain Zimbabwe as it has moved from the certainties of liberation to equally pure authoritarianism are unfulfilled.

There can be few books citing as many other texts, but even amid such riches Dorman seems far too certain that her selection of civil society actors, non-governmental organisations and opposition party members – even some war veterans make it into the holy category of 'social movements' – contrasts with the appositely unpleasant ZANU-PF politicians, whose nastiness simply worsens over time. (Chan and Gallagher's mild caution against placing Zimbabwe's opposition on a pedestal is a welcome contrast to this.)

Although rendering a good sense of ZANU-PF's attempts to legitimise its reign through increasingly desperate ideologies and practices, *Understanding Zimbabwe's* process of dividing up Zimbabwe's recent past seems too tight, conceptually and historically. Can one really say that the 1980s – the times Doran explains in excruciating detail – fit into Dorman's inclusive, relatively depoliticised and welfarist 'developmental' decade? These sections of the book seem to focus too much on 'reconciliation' with white businesses, big farmers and non-governmental organisations, while understating the moves against ZAPU and its purported supporters (pp. 36–41). It is not as if these contradictions – including their ethnic dimensions – are ignored, but they seem understated. It could be that ZANU-PF's protestations of unity in the country during this initial display of fracture disorient Dorman. Perhaps Doran's *Kingdom, Power, Glory* simply overshadows other attempts to comprehend Zimbabwe's history.

Dorman's full stride is reached in describing the heady days of 'polarisation', when new generations and a burgeoning civil society challenged the ruling party, eventually forming the MDC. She is at her best and most optimistic here. However, except for a quick analysis of the MDC's failures in the 2013 elections (pp. 198–9), we do not get much of a taste of the opposition's crumbling. It seems to have fallen from its pulpit very quickly. Similarly, the line leading ZANU-PF towards its 2017 coup is nearly invisible.

Critics of a teleology framing history as a Manichean clash between a vicious ruling party and kind liberal or social democrats can only take churlish pleasure in the crumbling of these verities as both Zimbabwean political formations fall apart. Yet even in the 1960s and 1970s there were indications of ZANU-PF's coup-inducing fracturing, as Dorman does observe (pp. 17–20). However, they get lost in her concentration on the opposition outside of the party-state in the 2000s. She leaves the internal contradictions of the superficially cohesive 'predatory state' to the side – an oversight rectified only at the last moment, and in passing (pp. 207–8).³⁹

Nevertheless, for those not jaundiced by overexposure to Zimbabwe's dichotomies, this chronicle of recent political history will be useful for attempts to discern when liberal-social democratic possibilities peaked. For ZANU-PF this is an easy call, as Doran substantiates. Assessing the attempts to supersede the ruling party's indelible stamps and stains on history causes more pain. That a 'new era' begins on the back of an intra-ZANU-PF coup in the fragile nation-state is not auspicious.

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Notes

1. Mhanda W, *Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter*. Harare: Weaver, 2011.
2. ZANU has been known as ZANU-PF since 1980. The 'Patriotic Front' label dates to the mid-1976 united front, formed to present one line to international diplomats. When in 1987 ZANU-PF swallowed the other historically important nationalist party, PF-ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo's the Zimbabwe African People's Union (which was usually called ZAPU, as it will be in the rest of this article), the ZANU-PF name remained.
3. Moore D, 'The Zimbabwean People's Army moment in Zimbabwean history, 1975–1977: Mugabe's rise and democracy's demise', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 32, 3, 2014, pp. 302–18.

4. Moore D, 'A very Zimbabwean coup: November 13–24 2017 – context, event, prospects', *Transformation*, in press.
5. Cheeseman N, *Democracy in Africa Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 66, n. 2.
6. This ignores the Gukuruhundi massacres. Furthermore, even though 'neo-patrimonialism' is a very imprecise concept and not explained here, there is every indication that an approximation of it was well under way in Zimbabwe's early years.
7. *Ibid.* The book's first page states that Robert Mugabe did not accept Zimbabwe's 2007 election results; the election was in March 2008. The second slippage is on p. 18, albeit rectified somewhat on pp. 161–2. Page 136 hosts the third.
8. Johnson RW, *South Africa's Brave New World: The Beloved Country since the End of Apartheid*. London: Allen Lane, 2009, p. 359; see pp. 366–7 for sloppy suspicions. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme report – Tibaijuka AK, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe. New York: United Nations, 2005 – provides the commonly cited but probably high figure of 700,000 people losing their homes and/or livelihoods (p. 7), and claims six deaths (p. 62). The latter number has raised no dispute.
9. Ian Scoones confused Gabriel García Márquez with Milan Kundera in his first rendering of 'The unbearable whiteness of being: reflections on white farming in Zimbabwe', *ZimbabweLand*, 25 February 2013. He acknowledges the mistake in a later iteration, <https://zimbabweLand.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/the-unbearable-whiteness-of-being/>, accessed 15 April 2018. I noted the mistakes (*two* not one) in 'Waiting for elections in 2013: 11 theses (with appropriate apologies) on Zimbabwe's moment of magical realism', *African Arguments*, 18 June 2013, <http://africanarguments.org/2013/06/18/11-theses-with-appropriate-apologies-on-zimbabwes-moment-of-magical-realism-waiting-for-elections-in-2013-by-david-moore/>, accessed 23 April 2018. The error on the MDC's birthday is in Scoones *et al.*, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities*. Harare: Weaver, 2010, p. 20. Scoones could be responsible for my increasing belief that magical realism is a worthy analytical mode for Zimbabwean (and many other) polities.
10. Kriger N, 'Review essay: Human rights and the Zimbabwe land debate', *African Studies*, 72, 2, 2013, pp. 181–5. For more on the issue, see Rutherford B, 'Shifting the debate on land reform, poverty and inequality in Zimbabwe, an engagement with *Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities*', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, 1, 2012, pp. 147–57 and Zamchiya P, 'A synopsis of land and agrarian change in Chipinge district, Zimbabwe', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38, 5, 2011, pp. 1 093–1 122.
11. Chagonda T, 'Teachers' and bank workers' responses to Zimbabwe's crisis: uneven effects, different strategies', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, 1, 2012, pp. 83–97.
12. Matondi P, *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*. London: Zed Books, 2012, pp. 96–103.
13. Moore D, 'Marxism and Marxist intellectuals in schizophrenic Zimbabwe: how many rights for Zimbabwe's left? A comment', *Historical Materialism*, 12, 4, 2004, pp. 409–410.
14. Hanlon J, Manjengwa J & T Smart, *Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land*. Johannesburg: Jacana, 2013, pp. 205–8.
15. Ndlovu-Gatsheni S (ed.), *Mugabeism? History, Politics and Power in Africa*. New York: Palgrave, 2015.
16. Translated as the 'spring storms that washed away the chaff', the Gukuruhundi massacres claimed the lives of thousands of Matabeleland and Midlands citizens soon after ZANU-PF's 1980 election victory.
17. Scarnecchia T, 'Front line diplomats: African diplomatic representations of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, 1976–1978', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1, 2017, pp. 107–24; Moore D, 'Lionel Cliffe and the generation(s) of Zimbabwean politics', *Review of African Political Economy*, 43, suppl. 1, 2016, p. 176.

18. Moore D, 'A decade of disquieting diplomacy: South Africa, Zimbabwe and the ideology of the national democratic revolution, 1999–2009', *History Compass*, 8, 8, 2010, pp. 752–67; Moore D, 'Death or dearth of democracy in Zimbabwe?', *Africa Spectrum*, 49, 1, 2014, p. 109; Moore D & T Scarnecchia, 'South African influence in Zimbabwe: from destabilization in the 1980s to liberation war solidarity in the 2000s', in Pallotti A & U Engel (eds), *South Africa after Apartheid: Policies and Challenges of the Democratic Transition*. Leiden: Brill, 2016, pp. 173–201.
19. Cameron H, 'The Matabeleland massacres: Britain's wilful blindness', *International History Review* 40, 1, 2018, pp. 1–19.
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21. UK National Archives, Prem 19/1154, 1983, Ewans (High Commissioner), Telo 810, 26 September 1983.
22. UK National Archives, Memo to Prime Minister's Office, 'Zimbabwe: General Review of Relations', 9 December 1982.
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24. Matyszak D, 'Back to the future: legitimising Zimbabwe's 2018 elections', *Southern Africa Report*, 12, Tshwane: Institute of Security Studies, 2017, p. 6.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 7. Matyszak cites only a website for this number, which reveals nothing when entered on the web. In time, I discovered Voice of America, 'Zimbabwe's MDC releases report naming perpetrators of political violence', 6 July 2010, <https://www.voazimbabwe.com/s?k=%22MDC%20releases%20report%20naming%20perpetrators%22&tab=all&pi=1&r=any&pp=10>, accessed 20 April 2018.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
29. Human Rights Watch, *Perpetual Fear: Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe*. New York: Human Rights Watch, March 2011, p. 3; United States State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 'Zimbabwe: 2008 Country reports on human rights practices', 25 February 2009, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119032.htm>, accessed 18 April 2018; Solidarity Peace Trust, *Punishing Dissent, Silencing Citizens: The Zimbabwe Elections 2008*. Johannesburg: SPT, 2008; Masunungure EV, 'A militarized election: the 27 June presidential run-off', in Masunungure EV (ed.), *Defying the Winds of Change, Zimbabwe's 2008 Elections*. Harare: Weaver, 2009, p. 86.
30. Email communications, 11 and 13 April 2018, for which the author is grateful. According to Matyszak, Zimbabwe's Counselling Services Unit counted about 270 dead over the years, including fatally injured who died later. By mid-2015 the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project recorded 170 fatalities and 794 violent 'events' in 2008, constituting 18.8% of all Africa's state-initiated violence that year, https://public.tableau.com/profile/acled6590#!/vizhome/Zimbabwe_1/ProportionZiminTotal, accessed 18 April 2018.
31. Matyszak D, op cit., p. 14.
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